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Abstract
A seller of a nondurable good repeatedly faces a buyer who is privately informed about the
position of his demand curve. The seller offers a price in each period. The buyer chooses a quantity
given the price. The quantity demanded reveals information about the buyer. An equilibrium is
characterized with the feature that buyer types separate completely in the first period. This equilibrium
uniquely satisfies a modified refinement of the Cho-Kreps criterion. Despite the immediate separation,
the buyer distorts his behavior throughout the game. The requirements to signal types can raise the
utility of all types of informed players.
Keywords: Repeated signalling games, refinements of equilibria, bilateral monopoly, bargaining,
ratchet effect. 
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1. Introduction
Playing hard to get is time-honored in markets as it is in love. The coy and clever buyer knows
that betraying too much eagerness to a seller can often place him at a disadvantage as their relationship
develops. However, feigned indifference comes at a cost. Delayed consumption destroys irrevocably
some  opportunities for satisfaction. A careful buyer must always balance his wish for immediate
gratification with a caution against betraying his true desires; an interested seller must balance her
desire to benefit from the current transaction with the need to extract information about the future of
the relationship. 
In dynamic games, this phenomenon gives rise to the so-called ratchet effect. When an
uninformed agent learns information early in a game, she can be expected to exploit it subsequently
to her opponent's disadvantage. One result is that the cost of inducing information revelation grows
the longer the trading relationship is expected to persist. The consequence of this behavior has been
found to suppress the revelation of information in dynamic games (see Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole
1985, Hart and Tirole 1988 or Laffont and Tirole 1987). These results have generally been derived
in models in which the uninformed agent is in an unusually strong strategic position either because
of her contracting power or because of very simple preferences of the informed agent which offer
agents of one type very little scope to separate from agents of another type. If the consequences of
revealing information to an uninformed agent are severe, then we can expect little information
revelation.  And, in dynamic trading games, if the only way agents can separate is through the stark
choice of zero purchases or single unit purchases, again we can expect little information revelation.
What happens in a different contracting environment and when preferences are such that the
possibilities for screening are richer?23
In Section 2, a dynamic contracting game is described in which two agents desire to trade a
divisible, non-durable good or a service, period by period. The buyer has private information about
the position of his demand curve. Since the relationship is dynamic, the problem of an uninformed
seller is twofold: to extract surplus from the current trade; and to extract information that may be
exploited in future trades. Allowing an agent in a bilateral monopoly the sole right to offer non-linear
contracts  yields that player a substantial amount of strategic power. This power and the temptation
to extract surplus in later periods reduces the ability to extract information in the current period. One
way to relax this stark formulation is to restrict the seller to another commonly observed type of offers,
linear contracts in which the seller offers a price and the buyer chooses a quantity. 
This game possesses a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with a very stark feature. For a large subset
of the parameter space, the equilibrium path is characterized by immediate information revelation by
both types. Despite the revelation, though, economic behavior continues to be distorted along the
equilibrium path as the low type buyer is forced to continue to convince the seller that he is indeed
a low type. The low type buyer separates from the high type by selecting a quantity determined by a
demand curve lower than his true demand in every period but the last even though at intermediate
stages of the game the seller has acquired enough information to know with probability one whether
the buyer is a high or low type.  In this sense, the equilibrium illustrates that HOW an agent knows
information as well as WHAT the agent knows can play an economic role. 
Dynamic games in which the informed player has a large strategy space are typically plagued
by a large set of equilibria. This model is no exception and, indeed, there also exist other separating
equilibria as well. It is natural, therefore, to investigate the plausibility of this particular equilibrium.
In Section 4, I show that if the model is extended to allow for any small but positive probability that2(at￿pt)qt￿q
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t , at￿{aL,aH}, q ￿ 0.
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a buyer's type might change in every period, then the equilibrium characterized in Section 3 is the
unique one to survive the iterative application of a well-known refinement of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. 
Section 5 examines other features of this equilibrium. As a result of the persistent concern that
a seller may revise her beliefs, the equilibrium behavior confers a surprising benefit on both buyer
types. In signalling games, one type of informed agent often incurs a cost due to the asymmetry of
information as he attempts to separate from the other type. In this environment, though, it is shown
that both types of buyers can benefit from the presence of asymmetric information. In a repeated
context, the fear that the uninformed agent may update in an unfavorable way following some actions
of the informed agent can serve as a valuable commitment device in earlier stages of the game that
allows the agent to commit to strategies that would otherwise not be credible.
2. The Model
In a T-period game , an uninformed supplier faces a buyer who is privately informed about his
2
preferences for a non-durable good.  The seller can provide the good at constant (zero) marginal cost
and seeks to maximize total discounted expected profits. A buyer of type a in period t obtains a per t
period utility from a quantity, q, of the good purchased at a per unit price,  p, given by tt
(1)
Observe that the marginal rates of substitution between q and the money good differs depending on t
the buyer type. The buyer wishes to maximize the expected value of the T-period discounted sum of
(1) (the discount factor, ￿, is the same for buyer and seller) and has private information about the true5
value of a which may be high or low. The prior probability that the buyer is a high type at the t
beginning of the game (Prob[a =  a]) is µ  ￿ (0,1).   An example generating these payoffs is a market TH T
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where the seller sells to a downstream retailer or importer who incurs a quadratic cost of distributing
the good. In addition, the true price the retailer receives upon reselling the object, a, remains private t
to the retailer perhaps because of unobserved taxes or rebates or other linear costs. 
In a myopic or static framework, the preferences of the buyer yield a demand curve of the form
q = max{0,a - p} and the monopolist's optimal price for a  ￿ a /2 is just a weighted combination of tt t L H
her monopoly price against each of the possible demand curves where the weight is given by her prior
belief about the buyer type. It is never optimal for the seller to charge a price above a /2 so there is H
no loss of generality in restricting attention to prices below this bound. However, if a <  a/2, even LH
in the static game, the seller's profit function is non-concave in prices for some beliefs. In this case,
her optimal price is either the weighted combination or just a /2 depending on her beliefs. Since these H
issues are not the focus of this paper, I rule out this possibility by maintaining the restriction, a  ￿ L
a /2. H
 The game consists of the following moves. At the beginning of each period, the seller offers
a per unit price and commits herself to providing any quantity the buyer chooses at that price. The
buyer then chooses a non-negative quantity.  In the dynamic game, the strategic power of the seller
is determined by the space of contracts available to her. The extreme case in which the seller may
choose only linear pricing contracts is restrictive but it is of interest for two reasons . A truly bilateral
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monopoly should have the characteristic that in the case of complete information, there is a non-trivial
sharing of surplus. Restrictions on the strategy space are often exploited to induce this division. One
way to model bilateral bargaining power would be to incorporate explicitly offer-counteroffer6
negotiations in each period as in Rubinstein (1982). Solving this game would be a daunting task. The
restriction to linear pricing schemes allows the construction of a game which forces the sharing of
some surplus and, as it turns out, is tractable. Furthermore, we often observe such restrictive pricing
schemes. For example, negotiations between unions and firms often have the characteristic that a wage
is determined (in this model, set by the union) and employment is then selected by the firm.  
In the next Section, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium  of the linear pricing game is illustrated
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with the feature that for a large class of parameter values the buyer types separate in every period. 
3. Equilibrium Behavior in the Linear Pricing Game -- the Case of Complete Separation
Dynamic signalling games typically possess many perfect Bayesian equilibria (pBe). The focus
of this paper is on equilibria which are fully revealing in every period. It is well-known that even in
"well-behaved" two-stage signalling games, fully separating equilibria may not exist if, given
preferences, the signalling space is not large enough to allow one type to profitably distinguish himself
from another type (Cho and Sobel 1990). Since I am interested in examining the nature of separation
in many period signalling games, that issue is side-stepped by placing restrictions on the parameter
space in order to allow the possibility of full and immediate revelation. The equilibrium characterized
in this section is extremely simple. In each period, buyer types separate for every price by choosing
a quantity determined by a linear demand curve independent of seller beliefs and of the history of the
game. The high type chooses the demand corresponding to his static demand curve, the low type, in
every period, chooses a quantity off a linear demand curve that is generally lower than (but parallel
to) his static demand curve. The actual position of the demand curve is such that in any period if the
buyer type is high, he is just indifferent between mimicking the low type in this period and for the restaLt ￿ aH￿ ￿(aH￿aLt￿1)(3aH￿aLt￿1)/2, for t ￿ 2.
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of the game and choosing his high demand. As a result, the more periods remaining to the end of the
game, the lower this low type equilibrium demand curve must be. (See Figure 1.)
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.]
The proof that such behavior is the outcome of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is best seen by
construction. Define a monotonic sequence, {a } as follows. Let x* = a (4-3￿)/(4-￿). If a  ￿ x*, set Lt H L
a =  a. Otherwise define a  iteratively by a  = a  and Lt L Lt L1 L
(2)
The intercept of the low type demand curves is given by a  in every period. It can be shown that a Lt Lt
converges to x* as t becomes large and that for a fixed t, a  falls with increases in ￿. In order to ensure Lt
that the signalling space is large enough to allow complete separation, I maintain the following
restriction on parameters: 
(A1) T,￿,a ,a  are such that a  ￿ a /2.  LH L T H
Notice that for ￿ ￿ 4/5, A1 holds for all values of T as long as a  ￿ a /2 holds.  LH
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we must specify seller beliefs following any history of the
game. In all of what follows, I consider equilibria in which the seller's beliefs may change only
following a move by the buyer. Given Bayes' rule, then, it is sufficient to characterize seller beliefs
solely by the sequence, {µ } , which is the probability the seller places on the buyer being a high tt =1
T
type in period t just before the seller posts a price, p. t8
Theorem 1: Assume A1. The following behavior can be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
outcome of the game. For any price, p, a buyer who is a high type in period t demands q  = a  - p t HH t
and a low type buyer demands q  = a  - p. For any history resulting in seller's beliefs in period t of Lt Lt t
µ  the seller offers a price p = (µ  a  + (1-µ )a )/2. t, t t H t Lt
Proof: For some period - onwards define strategies as
H1 : In every period, i ￿ -, for every history, for every seller belief, and for every price - -
offer, p, a high type buyer in period i demands a -  p  and a low type buyer demands iH i
a -  p . Li i
H2 : In every period, i ￿ -, for every history of the game, the seller offers a price, p(µ ) - - ii
= (µ a  + (1-µ )a )/2. iH i L i
Clearly, H1 and H2 are perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies for - = 1.  Suppose that they can be
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supported as pBe strategies following some period - = t-1. I show that they can also be supported as
pBe strategies for - = t and the theorem follows by induction. 
Observe that by assumption A1, p(µ ) ￿ a  in every period, so positive quantities will be ii L i
demanded in every period. H1 and H2 imply that in period t-1, whatever his behavior in the past, a
high type expects to separate by demanding a -  p  in period t-1 and that the subsequent equilibrium Ht -1
path is stationary. Thus, his payoff following period t-1 can be represented simply by some constant,
v .  Ht9
Now let p be a seller price offer in period t and define q  so that tL t
2(a- p )q- q +￿((a- p (0)) +v ) = (a- p )+ ￿((a- p (1)) +v ) H t Lt Lt H t-1 H t Ht Ht -1 Ht
2222
That is, q  is the highest quantity choice such that the high type is just indifferent between revealing Lt
herself now by demanding a -  p  or demanding q  in this period, persuading the seller he is a low type Ht L t
and receiving the lowest possible price, p (0) in period t-1. By H1, in either case, he will demand a- Lt H
p  in the following period and reveal his type. Note that q =  a -  p  where a  is defined by (2). t-1 Lt Lt t Lt
In order to show that demanding a- p  is optimal for the high type we need to describe the Ht
consequences of other choices. Observe that given H1 , the seller's strategy defined by H2  is t-1 t-1
sequentially rational and determined solely by her t-1'st period beliefs. The consequences of a deviant
quantity in period t, then, are determined by the effects of this quantity on the t-1'st period beliefs of
the seller, µ . For any history and any quantity choices, q ￿ q , the seller believes that the type is a t-1 tL t
low type in the current period with probability one and therefore µ  = 0. If q1 ￿ q , define µ*(q1) t-1 Lt
implicitly by
2(a- p )q1-q1 +￿((a- p (µ )) +v ) = (a- p )+ ￿((a- p (1)) +v ). Ht Ht -1 HH t H t -1 H
2* 2 2 2
For any history with q > q , she believes that the buyer is a high type with probability at least µ (q1) tL t
*
and therefore, µ  ￿ µ . (Note that even for µ  = 0, so the seller initially believes she is facing a high- t-1 t
*
type buyer with probability zero, whenever q1 > q  is an out-of-equilibrium event, seller updating Lt
from µ = 0 to µ  > 0 is consistent with pBe.) With these beliefs, the definition of µ  ensures that the tt -1
*
high type at least weakly prefers to demand a- p  to any lower quantity. Lemma 1 in the Appendix uses Ht
the induced preferences of the two types of buyers to show via a single-crossing property that the low
type strictly prefers q  which results in the lowest plausible price in the next period to any higher Lt
quantity and the higher next period price, p (µ*). Thus the behavior of both buyer types satisfy H1 t-1limT￿￿,￿￿1aLT￿aH/3
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for period t, and since buyer types separate for any price, there is no dynamic role of pricing for the
seller. For any seller belief in [0,1], given the separating behavior of the buyer for any p, the t
monopolist's optimization problem is exactly the same as the static problem confronting a monopolist
with a linear demand curve with intercept a  or a . Given A1, this problem is concave, p(µ ) ￿ a /2 HL t t tH
for all µ  and the behavior described in H2 is optimal for period t as well. Since H1 and H2 is satisfied t
for - = 1, induction implies that the behavior satisfies the conditions of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
for all periods T such that a  ￿ a /2.  b LT H
Notice that in the extreme case of ￿ = 0, buyers discount the future completely. In this case,
x* = a  and, by definition, a =  a for all t. Separation implies no distortion since there is no incentive HL L t
for the high-type to underdemand. Similarly with low ￿'s, separation will always occur and the
equilibrium corresponds to the repeated static solution.  
More interesting, however, is the case where the future matters because of a higher discount
factor. In this case, where x* < a , the succession of demand curves, a , is monotonically decreasing LL t
in t. As the length of the game increases, the low type buyer must underdemand more in order to
dissuade imitation by the high type. 
Observe that,
If ￿ is high and T is large, it is possible that assumption A1 is violated. This possibility is also a
potential source of non-concavity in the seller's optimization problem and her pure strategy best
response correspondence may not be convex-valued. In such cases, complete separation cannot be
supported by the perfect Bayesian equilibrium described in Theorem 1. Some partial pooling will
typically occur in early stages of the game such that a <  a /2. Initially, then, there may be some LT H11
gradual learning. In these cases, the equilibrium behavior is not as simple as that of Theorem 1 since
they will typically involve mixed strategies in equilibrium for the high type buyer and mixed strategies
(out of equilibrium) for the seller. These complications are accounted for in an earlier version of this
paper (Vincent, 1994) which provides a characterization of equilibrium strategies over the full
parameter space. For values of a,  a,  ￿, and t such that a  ￿ a /2, the equilibrium paths coincide. HL L t H
Otherwise, if the seller believes relatively strongly that the buyer is a high type, it may be in her best
interest to offer prices which induce only gradual revelation by the high-type buyer. In these periods,
behavior very similar to the original ratchet effect of Laffont and Tirole emerges. The high-type buyer
reveals himself with some probability, ￿. Only as the game approaches the later periods does complete t
separation emerge.
Theorem 1 characterizes only one of many possible pBe. Even in two stage signalling games,
pooling equilibria often can coexist with separating equilibria. This is true here for T = 2 and,
therefore, for T > 2 as well. In two-period games, many such pooling equilibria fail to survive common
belief-based refinements of perfect Bayesian equilibria. I show next that a similar approach may be
applied in the multi-period game. A recursive application of the Cho-Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion
is defined. The original game is modified to allow for stochastically changing types (but with
arbitrarily small probabilities of changes). Theorem 2 illustrates that, in this game, the equilibrium
path described in Theorem 1 is the only one to survive this restriction.
4. A Refinement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
The equilibrium characterized in Theorem 1 has the feature that the private information of the
buyer is revealed in the first period of the game. This stark learning behavior points to an intriguing
and controversial feature of the equilibrium. If the seller observes an equilibrium low quantity in an12
early period of the game, she must believe she is facing a low type with probability one. Furthermore,
she must continue to believe she is facing a low type throughout the rest of the game. Even so, it is
not sequentially rational for her to revert to the optimal monopoly price, a /2 against a low type. L
Instead, since the low type is demanding off a lower demand curve, a -  p , the seller's sequentially Lt t
rational price falls to a /2. Despite the equilibrium generated knowledge that the low type is in the Lt
game, behavior continues to be distorted along the equilibrium path.
Is this apparently counterintuitive feature simply a curiosum of the large size of the set of
perfect Bayesian equilibria of repeated signalling games? One way to approach this question is to
determine whether the equilibrium would survive the application of a common refinement of
sequential equilibrium. A difficulty arises however, in the attempt to extend the definitions of these
refinements to multistage games with full separation. After separation occurs, the seller will believe
with probability zero that the buyer is of a particular type. But many belief-based refinements require
the comparison of the value to various types of potential continuation paths following a deviation. In
this environment, such a comparison would be vacuous if we did not allow the seller to consider the
possibility of changing her belief from probability zero to a positive probability. 
The equilibrium characterized in Theorem 1 exhibits this phenomenon of increasing supports
off the equilibrium path. Seller updating includes the feature that for high-quantity deviations the
seller will change her belief that the buyer is a high-type with probability zero to a belief that the buyer
is a high-type with some positive probability. Note that perfect Bayesian equilibria (and sequential
equilibria) of signalling games not only allows for this type of updating, in some games, it is required
to ensure the existence of sequential equilibrium. (See, Madrigal, Tan and Werlang, 1987 and van
Damme and Noldeke, 1990.) Beaudry and Poitevin also use a dynamic extension of a standardProb[at￿aH￿at￿1￿ai]￿￿i,i￿L,H,0￿￿L￿￿H￿1,
for t￿1,2,...,T￿1.
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refinement to analyze one-shot signalling game with the possibility of later renegotiation. Their model
also yields equilibria where the uninformed agent's beliefs feature increasing supports off the
equilibrium path. 
In this section, I skirt the issue by extending the model to ensure that the uninformed agent can
never believe she is facing any given type with probability one. The extended model introduces the
possibility that informed agents' types may change exogenously in every period. Bayesian updating
by the seller must take this possibility into account when she formulates her new beliefs. Specifically,
let a  be the buyer's type in period t+1 and assume that in any period, buyer types follow a stationary t+1
Markovian process of the following form:
(3)
Thus, conditional on being of type i in period t+1, the buyer is relatively more likely to be of type i
in period t. I focus on the limiting case where ￿  approaches one and ￿  approaches zero, but the HL
model could, of course, be interpreted literally as a description of a game where there is a significant
probability that types change over the course of the game. Consistent with full rationality, both the
buyer and the seller factor in the possibility of future type changes in the determination of current
optimal strategies. The operative role of this modification is that for any ￿  > 0, in no period, does the L
seller believe with probability zero, she is facing a high-type buyer and therefore, the issue of non-
increasing supports does not arise. This feature is used to describe the extension of the refinement.
Before defining the refinement formally, it may be helpful to walk through a short example to
illustrate its application in a three period game with a  = 1, ￿ = 1, a  = 3/4 and ￿  = 1.  Consider the HL H
7
subform of the game beginning at the second stage of the second last period with the seller's price, p , 2
already set and with some current seller belief, µ , strictly above 0. Sequential rationality imposed on 2V(q2,p1:p2,ai)￿(ai￿p2)2￿(ai￿p2￿q2)2￿￿i(1￿p1)2￿(1￿￿i)(3/4￿p1)2,
i￿L,H.
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the buyer in the last period implies that we can represent buyer types's preferences in (q ,p ) space by 21
the following induced utility function:
Figure 2 illustrates these preferences in (q ,p ) space. It can be shown (Lemma 1) that these 21
indifference curves are concave and that the slope of the high type indifference curves are steeper than
those of the low type. Seller behavior in the last period is determined for any belief µ , and since buyer 1
behavior in the last period is a function only of seller price, p , a two-period signalling game emerges 1
from the overlap of the second stage of period two and the first stage of the last period. The buyer's
second period quantity demand acts as a signal which the seller observes and generates a response
which is the final period price. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.]
In a two-period signalling game, the Cho-Kreps (1987) Intuitive Criterion (what will be
refinement R  in the multi-period game) rules out candidate pBe outcomes such as point A in Figure 2
2 as follows.  Trace the indifference curve of the high-type downward and to the left until it crosses
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the p  = 3/8 line at q1. Suppose a deviant quantity, q1 - ￿ is demanded at this stage. There is no seller 1
belief and subsequent best response that could yield an outcome for the high type buyer that the buyer
prefers to the candidate outcome, A. On the other hand, if the seller updates her beliefs following the
deviation by putting zero weight on the high type and responds with the price p  = 3/8, for small 1
enough ￿, the low type gains a strictly higher payoff than from A. In a simple two-stage signalling
game, the Cho-Kreps criterion would imply that the seller then should believe that only a low type15
would demand such a low quantity and therefore update with a belief µ  = ￿  and respond with a price 1 L
in the last period of p  = 3/8.  1
This argument can be used to eliminate all pooling outcomes. The only outcome that survives
the restriction to this type of seller updating rule is the separating outcome B for the high type and C
for the low type shown also in Figure 2. The high type receives his full information equilibrium payoff
while the low type underdemands just enough so as to dissuade imitation from the high type. This last
condition yields the quantity q  = a  - p  = 5/8 - p  for any price offer p . Thus a lower "effective" L2 L22 2 2
demand curve determines the low type's behavior in the second to last period.
Given the necessary buyer behavior in period 2, the seller's best response in period 2 is again
a simple function of her beliefs: p(µ ) = (µ  + (1-µ )*5/8)/2. The fact that the buyer types separate for 22 2
any sequentially rational price offer of the seller implies that there is no informational (and therefore
no dynamic) role of prices. Instead, the seller is again in a situation analogous to that of the static
monopolist facing one of two possible demand curves. This time, though, the low demand curve is
lower than before because of the low type's desire to separate from the high type.
Observe that, except for the determination of the seller's price, p , this argument is made 2
independent of the actual value of the seller's current prior, µ . What is required is that, fixing any 2
candidate equilibrium, for `low enough' deviant quantities, the seller will believe that a low type made
the demand. This requirement, in turn, requires that to support the only equilibrium outcome
satisfying this feature, we be able to place a high enough probability that a high type makes a deviant
quantity above the low type's quantity, q . If T = 2, then these requirements are satisfied as long as a L2 L
> a /2 and µ  = µ  > 0. In a three-period game, the issue becomes more delicate if ￿  = 0, because then HT 2 L
it is possible that along the equilibrium path, µ  = 0.  216
Given that buyers expect to separate in this manner  for all prices in the second stage of the
middle period, the utility that each buyer type expects from any continuation path at the beginning of
period 2 will be a function only of the seller price offer, p , independent of the history of the game. 2
Furthermore, if we move forward in the game to the second stage of the initial period, with a seller
price, p , outstanding, it can be shown that the induced buyer preferences over the quantity they 3
demand given this price and the subsequent p  that this generates from the seller are qualitatively 2
similar to those in Figure 2. The equilibrium path isolated in Theorem 1 is obtained by applying the
intuitive criterion (R ) after replacing the continuation paths of the game with the expected payoffs 3
(which depend only on the seller beliefs and through them on subsequent seller price offers).  An
argument similar to that for the overlap of period 2 and 1 applies here as well and yields complete
separation again in the first period, this time with the low type buyer demanding a quantity, q  = 1- L3
.5((1-5/8)(3-5/8))  = .528 - p. 
.5
t
The equilibrium price path follows one of two patterns. Independent of the buyer type, the
initial price is given by (µ +(1-µ )a )/2. If the buyer is a high type, the quantity demanded is relatively 33 L3
high, and subsequent prices move immediately to 1/2 in each of the remaining two periods. If the
buyer is a low type, the initial demand is lower than the low type's static demand, the seller's next
period price falls to a price below her static monopoly price against a low type and then rises as the
game continues.
The characterization of the formal refinement requires some more notation and definitions.
Let h denote a history of a game up to the end of period t and (h,p ) denote the history to the middle t tt -1
of period t-1.   Since a strategy determines the continuation play of the game for any given history, we
9
can compute expected payoffs from t-1 onwards for buyer and seller given a history and a strategy, ).BR
t
((µ)￿{pt￿pt￿argmax(µu
)
t (ht￿1,pt,aH)￿(1￿µ)u
)
t (ht￿1,pt,aL)
for some )￿(}.
17
Denote the buyer's expected payoff by v (h,p ,a) when the history is (h,p ), the buyer type in period
)
ttt -1 jt t -1
t is a and the strategies from t onwards are determined by ). The seller's expected payoff from the j
same stage in the game onward, conditional on the buyer type in period t being a is u (h,p ,a). Given jt t t -1 j
)
a history, (h,p ) and a profile of pure strategies,  ), let q (h,p ,a) be the strategy choice of a buyer tt -1 t-1  tt -1 j
10 )
who is of type a in period t-1. Similarly, p (h) is the corresponding seller price choice fixed by ). jt -1 t
)
A pBe also characterizes seller beliefs after any history. Let µ (h) denote the seller's interim t-1 t
)
probability that the buyer is a high type at the beginning of period t-1 (following the random move by
nature at the beginning of period t-1). Recall that I consider only pBe such that beliefs may change
only after buyer deviations.
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Definition 1: A subset of perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies, (, satisfies condition C if for all t
strategy profiles, ) ￿ (, for all i ￿ t, for all h ,h1 , for all p ￿ a /2, q (h ,p,a) = q (h1 ,p,a), a ￿ i+1 i+1 iH i i +1 ii i i +1 ii i
))
{a, a}. LH
Definition 1 characterizes a class of strategies which exhibit a strong type of stationarity from
some period t to the end of the game. Since for any pBe, q (h ,p ,a ) = a  - p , for all histories, the set
)
1211 1 1
of all pBe strategies satisfies C . 1
Definition 2: For any set of pBe strategies, (, satisfying C, define  t
BR  is not necessarily the set of seller equilibrium strategies since any given seller belief µ (
tRt(()￿{)￿(￿~ht￿1,~pt￿aH/2,for any ˜ q￿{q
)
t (ht￿1,pt,aL),q
)
t (ht￿1,pt,aH)}
such that if
v
)
t (ht￿1,pt,˜ q,p,aj)￿v
)
t (ht￿1,pt,aj) ~p￿BR
t
((µ)~µ￿[￿L,￿H],
and
v
)
t (ht￿1,pt,˜ q,p,ak)>v
)
t (ht￿1,pt,ak), for some p￿BR
t
((￿k),j,k￿{L,H},kgj,
then,µ
)
t￿1(ht,pt,˜ q)￿￿k}.
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may never arise in a pBe. However, in order to apply the refinement, I want the ability to conduct
thought experiments that range over all possible seller beliefs following a deviation. This device
allows that flexibility. Notice that u  is defined as a function of the strategy profile alone, not seller
)
beliefs. The variation of beliefs, µ, in the current period is not assumed to affect future play of the
game.  
12
I now define a refinement of a subset of pBe. 
Definition 3: If ( is a subset of pBe of the T period game satisfying C ,  t-1
If ( does not satisfy C , then R(() = (.  The refinement is generated by applying R t-1 t t
iteratively. Let (  be the full set of pBe. The T-fold application of the refinement yields the subset of 1
pBe, (  = R (R (...R (( )...)) ￿ R (( ). TT T -1 1 1 1
T
In words, the t'th refinement states the following.  Suppose that all the pBe under
consideration,  ( , have the feature that buyer behavior is stationary in all periods following period t-1
t and, so, continuation payoffs will depend only on the seller's subsequent price offers, which in turn
depend only on her subsequent beliefs. Then, if a deviant demand occurs in period t with the
characteristic that, given the hypothesized equilibrium continuation, one type does worse for any
sequentially rational seller price offer while there is a sequentially rational seller price offer for which
the other type does strictly better, then the seller must believe that it was the latter type who deviatedaLt￿min{aL,aH￿ ￿(￿H￿￿L)(3(￿HaH￿(1￿￿H)aLt￿1)￿(￿LaH￿(1￿￿L)aLt￿1)/2}
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in period t. Theorem 2 shows that for any ￿  > 0, the equilibrium path described in Theorem 1 is the L
only one to survive the T-fold application of this refinement.
Theorem 2: Let (  be the set of pBe and define (  = R (( ). Assume A1 and suppose ￿  > 0. If ) ￿ 1T 1 L
T
( , then ) generates the equilibrium path described in Theorem 1 with a  defined as T Lt
Proof: The proof of Theorem 2 is found in the Appendix. 
The direct application of refinement, R  puts restrictions on how the seller can update when
T
she observes lower than expected quantities demanded. In a way, it allows the low type the
opportunity to destroy any pooling equilibrium by signalling his type with a low quantity demand. The
richness of the preferences implies that the high type is not willing to sacrifice high quantity
consumption now for lower prices in the future. However, this restriction eliminates many pBe and
as a consequence it also forces restrictions on how she may update when higher than expected
quantities are observed. Even though information is fully revealed, screening costs are incurred
throughout the game. After the first period, both the buyer and the seller know all the relevant
information for the rest of the game. Nevertheless, the equilibrium strategy of the low type is to
underdemand for the remainder of the game (except the final period). He acts as if he had a demand
curve with a strictly lower intercept. Given this behavior, the seller can do no better than to post a
lower price. The buyer who is informed that he is of a low type signals this to the seller in the first
period but is `forced' to continue to convince the seller throughout the game. There is a sense in20
which, although, all the information is revealed immediately, complete separation has really not
occurred until the game is fully over.
  Observe that a condition of the theorem is that ￿  > 0. If ￿  = 0, there are other pBe satisfying LL
R . For example, in the three-period game , a pBe exists with the following characteristics. In the first
T 13
period, for any price, p , the low type demands a low enough quantity, q , that even if the high type 3 3
demanded q , was offered p =  a/2 for the rest of the game and the buyer was able to demand a- p 3 LL HL
in the last two periods, the high type still prefers to demand a- p and reveal himself. In this H 3
equilibrium, the seller believes µ  = 0 (µ =1) if she sees the low (high) quantity in the first period and 22
never changes it for the rest of the game. In the subsequent periods, she offers the full information
static price, a /2 or a /2. The equilibrium is not eliminated by R . It may seem odd that if the seller LH
3
sees first a low quantity and then the quantity a -  p, she never wavers from her belief, µ = 0. H 2
However, the demand a -  p = q (h ,p ,a ) and therefore, according to Definition 3, there is no H 22 3 2 H
)
restriction implied for how she should update. 
This type of equilibrium does not result in the peculiar phenomenon of reaching a point in the
game where it is common knowledge that the buyer is a low type and yet underdemanding persists
and, perhaps, is attractive for that very reason. On the other hand, it implies a sort of dogmatic belief
formation by the seller. She forms her belief in the first period of the game and never changes her mind
thereafter. Not surprisingly, for very long games, it is much harder to support complete separation with
this type of equilibria since the temptation for the high type to deviate in the first period and get a low
price for many periods in spite of high demands is very strong. To support these dogmatic equilibria
for games of arbitrarily many periods and for any a >  a/2 requires a discount factor below 4/9 which LH
is much lower than the 4/5 bound in the equilibrium characterized in Theorem 1 (see the comment21
following assumption A1.) Of course, there may also be other separating equilibria with less dogmatic
behavior by the seller. For example she may change her mind only after observing some fixed number
of deviations, but then some assessment would have to be made concerning what is a reasonable
number of deviations before the seller should switch her beliefs.
No equilibrium of this type survives the application of the refinement with ￿  > 0 because µ L 2
> 0 after any history leading to period 2 and, by Bayes' rule, if the seller observes a high demand in
period 2 she must believe it came from a high type and respond with a high price in period 1. The
definition of q  would then fail to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint on the high type. Of 3
course, the pBe described in Theorem 1 also survives in the limit as ￿  goes to zero. L
5. Implications of Equilibrium
The equilibrium exhibits some intuitive comparative statics. As long as we continue to assume
that A1 holds, the low type's demand falls as ￿ rises. He must distort his demand even further the more
important the future becomes. Similarly, as T becomes large, the more the low type must underdemand
in early periods since longer games offer greater rewards to a high type who successfully mimics a low
type. Finally, holding ￿ +￿  fixed, demand rises as ￿ -￿  falls. The closer the ￿'s, the less valuable is HL H L
current information, and therefore the less costly it is for the low type to separate from the high type.
The equilibrium characterized in Section 3 exhibits some additional noteworthy
characteristics. A sort of ratchet effect is still present although in a different sense than in the nonlinear
model. There, the principal is forced to offer a more generous scheme in order to induce information
revelation. In the case of the linear contracting game, the informed agents will often reveal following
any price offer of the seller. However, it is this behavior which forces the seller's price offer to be22
lower than in a static price setting problem. For any given belief of the seller, her optimal price is
higher with the same belief as the game nears the final period.
Since, in equilibrium, information is completely revealed in each period, it is interesting to
compare the results here with those of a similar model where the buyer has the same preferences but
acts non-strategically.  Both types can benefit from the strategic behavior. To see this, note that the
price offer of the seller is typically lower in the strategic game. If the true state is high, the lower price
is a straight gain to the buyer. When the true state is low, the lower price is a benefit even though the
buyer is also forced to underdemand relative to his true demand curve. For a  > a /3, a condition Lt L
implied by A1, the low type buyer is made strictly better off by the lower price.
Consider the simple T = 2 game. In a game where there is no possibility of a high type,
subgame perfection forces the buyer to choose q = a  - p in every period and, therefore, the L
equilibrium price path is just p = a /2 in each period. In the game with a small initial probability of L
a high type, the initial price is (close to) a /2 < a /2 and then reverts to a /2 in the last period if the L2 LL
type is in fact low. Even with the lower quantity demanded in the first period, the low type does better
than in the game with no possibility of a high type.  This result is noteworthy since it represents a
14
situation in which informed types are in a position in which they are forced to separate but the
separation can benefit both types. In a typical screening model, some types of the informed players are
usually forced to incur screening costs to separate themselves from other types. Here the screening
environment can bestow an advantage. In a static or non-strategic monopoly pricing game, a low type
buyer would prefer it if, by committing to demand a lower quantity, he could convince the seller to
offer a lower price. In general, the technology for such a commitment is lacking. Here, though, the low
type has a credible concern that the seller will mistake him for a high type in the remainder of the23
game. The concern serves as a commitment device and allows him to induce a lower price from the
seller to shift some of the surplus from the trade in his direction. This differs from results in standard
two-stage signalling games because of the addition of at least one earlier stage where the actions of
the uninformed agent (the seller's initial pricing stage) is affected by the later signalling concerns of
the informed agent. In addition, the strategy space of the uninformed agent is rich enough to allow for
strategy choices that both types strictly prefer to the strategy choices in the complete information
game. For example, in Kreps and Wilson's (1982) multi-period signalling game, a version of the
chainstore paradox, the uninformed entrant can only decide whether to enter or not. In that
environment, never enter is the outcome in a complete information game with the strong incumbent
and there are no other strategies which can benefit both types as in this game where both types prefer
the lower price. As a result, the possibility for this beneficial commitment feature did not arise in their
model.
6. Conclusion
The ability of a seller to extract information depends on her strategic power. The more
powerful the seller, the more dangerous it is for an informed buyer to reveal his private information
and in long games the ratchet effect shows us that the result is very little information transfer. If the
strategic power is more equally shared, though, as in linear contracting games, the likelihood of
information revelation rises dramatically. In this class of bilateral monopoly games, the signalling
space is rich enough for informed buyers to separate in each period. However, even though this
separation conveys a great deal of information, it does not relieve the players of the burden of
separation in subsequent play of the game. Some transactions are not consummated even if the players24
are virtually certain that they should be. The disinterested partner shows his true colors in the first
period and proves it over and over for the rest of the relationship by demanding less of his partner than
he truly desires. Playing hard to get results in the persistence of an under-requited love.
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 2: If a =  a, then the proof is similar but simpler so I focus on the harder case Lt L
with a  < a . Let (  be the subset of pBe such that buyer behavior satisfies H1  from Theorem 1. Lt L t-1 t-1
Note that this stationary and separating buyer behavior implies that for ) ￿ ( , after any history h t-1 i+1
resulting in a seller belief, µ , i ￿ t-1, the seller's unique sequentially rational response must be p(µ ) i ii
= (µa  + (1-µ )a )/2. Since (  satisfies C , BR (µ) = p(µ). Also note that the set of all pBe equals iH i L i t -1 t-1 ( i
i
(  and satisfies (  = R (( ) since any seller posterior µ  is irrelevant because the game has ended. By 11 1 1 0
Theorem 1, (  = R (R (...R (( )..)) is non-empty. If we can show that for (  = R (R TT T -1 1 1 t-1 t-1 t-
(...R (( )))...), ) ￿ R(( ) implies that buyer behavior according to ) satisfies H1 then Theorem 2 21 1 tt -1 t
follows by induction. Therefore, suppose that (  = R (R (...R (( ))). Let ) ￿ R(( ) and let p be t-1 t-1 t-2 1 1 tt -1 t
any price offered after any history. Since H1  fixes buyer behavior in the following periods, for any t-1
quantity, q, chosen in this period, and price p  offered in the next period, the continuation utility of t-1
a buyer of type L in period t, given ) is
V(q,p;a,p) = (2(a - p) - q)q + ￿{￿(a -  p ) +  ( 1 - ￿)((a -  p )- ( a- a )) } + K1 jt j t jH j L LL t -1 jt
22 2
= (a-p)- ( a - p - q) +  ￿{￿(a -  p ) +  ( 1 - ￿)(a -  p )} + K , jt j t jH j L j t
22 2 2
for constants K , j = L,H. By H1  and sequential rationality on the seller, p  must lie between p jt t-1 t-1 t-
(￿ ) = p  and p (￿ ) = p . The worst that can happen to the buyers in the next period is the 1 LL t -1 t-1 HH t -1
highest of these prices, therefore a buyer who is a high type in period t has continuation utility that
is bounded by what he would get if he chose the current period utility maximizing quantity, a -  p Ht
and received the highest price in the next period, p : Ht-1
(5) V(q,p;a ,p) ￿ (a -  p ) +  ￿{￿ (a -  p ) +  ( 1 - ￿ )(a -  p )} + K . Ht H t HH H t -1 HL H t -1 Ht
22 2dp
dq￿j
￿
aj￿pt￿q
￿(˜ aj￿p)
.
dp
dq￿L
￿dp
dq￿H
￿1
￿
(
aL￿pt￿q
˜ aL￿p
￿
aH￿pt￿q
˜ aH￿p
).
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We use the following result concerning the continuation function in the proof. 
Lemma 1: For any ￿ ,￿ , with 1 ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿  ￿ 0, if (q,p) satisfy (5), the indifference curves generated HL H L
by V are concave and the slope of the H curve is greater than that of the L curve.
Proof: Let  a  = ￿ a +(1-￿ )a  and a =  ￿ a +(1-￿ )a . In what follows I focus on the case, q ￿ a -
~~
HH H H L L L H L L L
p. If q > a  - p, then the indifference curves slope in opposite directions and the single crossing Lt
property follows in a similar but simpler manner. Observe that in (q,p) space, the line p  =  a -  a +
~
HH
p + q lies below the line p = a  - a  + p + q and so p ￿ a  -a  + p +q implies p ￿ a -  a +  p + q . t L Lt H Ht L Lt
~~ ~
For q ￿ a - p , the level sets of V are given by jt
If (q,p) satisfy p = a - a + p +q, the indifference curve has a slope of 1/￿ ￿ 1. Since p  ￿  a /2,
~ ~
jj t Ht-1 H
the point ((a -  p ),p ) lies strictly below the line p  =  a -  a +  p  +q which has a slope of one. An Ht H t -1 HH t
~
indifference curve which passes through ((a -  p ),p ) cannot cross that line, since at the point of Ht H t -1
crossing, it would have a slope that exceeds the slope of the line. Therefore the set defined by (5) lies
below the line p = a  - a  + p +q. The following results rely on this fact. 
~
HH t
Taking differences gives,
Rearranging, gives1
￿
(
˜ aL￿p￿p￿(˜ aL￿aL￿pt￿q)
˜ aL￿p
￿
˜ aH￿p￿p￿(˜ aH￿aH￿pt￿q)
˜ aH￿p
).
dp
dq￿L
￿dp
dq￿H
￿1
￿
(
p￿(˜ aH￿aH￿pt￿q)
(˜ aL￿p)
￿
p￿(˜ aH￿aH￿pt￿q)
˜ aH￿p
)
￿1
￿
(p￿(˜ aH￿aH￿pt￿q))￿( 1
˜ aL￿p
￿ 1
˜ aH￿p
),
d 2p
dq 2
￿j
￿((
aj￿pt￿q
￿(˜ aj￿p)
)2￿1)/(aj￿pt￿q).
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Cancelling the one in each term and noting that a -  a > 0 >  a -  a we get
~~
LL HH
which is less than zero for p ￿ a -  a +  p  + q  and ￿  ￿ ￿ .
~
HH t H L
Differentiate along the indifference curve to get
which is less than zero for p ￿ a - a + p +q. This yields the concavity of the indifference curves.  b
~
jj t
Let q  be a quantity prescribed by ) for the high type in period t and let % be the next period H
seller price. Since ￿  > 0, q  must occur with positive probability and if H alone demands q , we must LH H
have % = p . In general, we must have % > p . If % < p , then the low type must also choose q Ht-1 Lt-1 Ht-1 H
with positive probability. Define   q(q, %,p) by
￿
Ht
V(  q,p ;a, p ) = (a -  p )- ( a  - p - q ) +  ￿{￿ (a  - %) +  ( 1 - ￿ )(a -  %)} + K .
￿ 22 2 2
Lt-1 H t Ht HtH H H H L H t
(In Figure 2,   q corresponds to q1.) Substituting in the definitions also yields that if q =  a -  p  and
￿
HH t
% = p ,   q = q  = a  - p where a  is defined in equation (4) (if a  < a .) By assumption A1,   q ￿ q Ht-1 Lt Lt t Lt Lt L Lt
￿ ￿
is strictly positive.
Suppose that a deviant offer q =   q - ￿ is demanded. By Lemma 1 and assumption A1, there
￿
is an ￿ small enough that q > 0 and the high type strictly prefers q  to q and its consequent H
continuation to the deviation and the best possible continuation that he can hope for while the low28
type strictly prefers demanding q, receiving the subsequent price p  = BR (￿ ) in the next period Lt-1 ( L
t-1
and abiding by the behavior described by H1  subsequently. By the refinement R, then the seller t-1 t
must believe that a low type demanded q and sequential rationality along with the buyer behavior,
H1  requires her to respond with the price, p  in the next period. This breaks any pooling behavior t-1 Lt-1
in period t. A similar argument follows to show that any separating outcome must satisfy condition
H1. Therefore, ( = R(( ) and yields buyer behavior H1 and induction yields the result. b tt t t -1 t29
E-mail -- vincent@sscl.uwo.ca. This paper has benefitted from conversations with Morton
1
Kamien and Alejandro Manelli and the detailed comments of two referees.
The denotation, period t, refers to the period in which t periods remain to the end of the game.
2
Thus period 1 is the last period and period T is the first.
With the exception of the treatment in Section 4, for most of the paper, I assume that once a
3
buyer's type is chosen by Nature, it remains fixed for the remainder of the game.
The case in which a seller offers non-linear contracts is examined in the two-period case in
4
a slightly different model by Laffont and Tirole (1987).
For a definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). This
5
definition which more closely corresponds to that of sequential equilibrium is slightly more restrictive
than that used in earlier applications such as Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985).
Where it is clear, the - subscript is dropped.
6
I also set ￿  very small so some of the actual numbers are not precisely correct but are the
7
L
limits as ￿  goes to 0. L
Point A represents a pooling outcome since any seller offer strictly between 3/8 and 1/2 in the
8
last period can only be generated by a seller belief strictly between 0 and 1.
For buyers, a history includes the realized price offers, demand choices AND the realization
9
of buyer types to that period. For the seller, a history only includes the first two sequences.
This definition does not require pure strategies but i) as long as A1 is satisfied, the
10
equilibrium will be in pure strategies, and ii) restriction to pure strategies requires less notation so I
will refer only to the pure strategy case here.
There is another somewhat technical restriction. The original definition of perfect Bayesian
11
equilibrium (for example, Freixas, Guesnerie, Tirole 1985) placed relatively few restrictions following
FOOTNOTES30
out-of-equilibrium histories. Suppose that an out-of-equilibrium history occurs and the pBe assigns
subsequent beliefs {µ}  following it. Even if the continuation path follows the prescription of the ii = t -1
1
pBe following the out-of-equilibrium history, the original definition did not force µ  and µ  to be ii -1
consistent with Bayes' rule and the equilibrium strategies. However, in finite games this additional
restriction would be implied by sequential equilibrium via the condition of consistency and it seems
natural to require it here as well. This restriction requires that beliefs following an out-of-equilibrium
move be what Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) term `reasonable' beliefs.
More generally, one might prefer to consider how the continuation path for the rest of the
12
game changes also with changes in the period t belief. However, since pBe fixes strategies and then
appends beliefs, the machinery of pBe does not allow us to specify variations of continuation strategies
following changes in period t beliefs. An alternative approach which could achieve this would be to
use the concept of meta-strategy introduced in Grossman and Perry (1986). 
In a two-period game, the equilibrium path described in this paragraph and that of Theorem
13
1 coincide.
Observe that since with T = 2, the "dogmatic" equilibrium discussed after Theorem 2 and the
14
equilibrium described in Theorem 1 coincide so this result does not necessarily rely on the refinement.31
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